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CHINA’SDEVELOPMENTOF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICLAWANDWTOLEGALCAPACITY
BUILDING
Pasha L. Hsieh*
ABSTRACT
This article examines legal and institutional aspects of the evolution of
China’s approach to the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). It begins by analyzing the impact of China’s changing
attitude toward international law on the escalation of international economic
law research. In particular, the article provides the first detailed examination
of China’s efforts to strengthen public–private cooperation in building its
WTO legal capacity. China established think tanks to bridge the information
and communication gaps between the government and industries. To de-
velop its WTO lawyers, the Chinese government has consistently required
international law firms to collaborate with domestic firms in major disputes
and engaged the latter in third-party cases. Finally, the article evaluates
China’s assertive legalism strategy that enhances its recent participation in
WTO rule-making and disputes against the US and the European Union.
This research, therefore, provides a valuable case study for other emerging
economies and the multilateral trading system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary indication of China’s emergence as a global power is its aston-
ishing growth since the 1980s. Today, China is the world’s largest holder
of foreign exchange reserves, the third-largest economy and a market that
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attracts $23,435 billion in foreign investments.1 Even in the midst of the
financial crisis, the economic growth of China contributed to more than
50% of global development.2 China’s trade has also elevated its position
on the international stage, as demonstrated by the World Bank’s recent
decision to increase China’s shares, that is, voting power, to the third
place in the world.3
China’s economic success could not have been achieved in less than three
decades absent its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001.4 WTO membership not only marks a milestone that signifies
China’s integration into the international legal order, but also poses new
challenges to the world trading system. Many scholars have contributed to
the literature on the importance of China vis-a`-vis the WTO, primarily dis-
cussing the impact of China’s WTO membership5 or legal issues that arose
in dispute settlement cases involving China.6 Nonetheless, this article adopts
1 China’s Foreign Reserves Top $2tn, 15 July 2009, BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/8151223.stm (visited 1 May 2010); Trade Policy Report by Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/
S/199 (16 April 2008), at 1; Table 4: China’s Trade with the World ($ billion), US-China
Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, The US–China Business Council, avail-
able at http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (visited 25 April 2010); Non-Financial
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows, 2000–09, Foreign Direct Investment in China,
available at http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi_cumulative.htm (visited 30 April 2010). It is
also noteworthy that China is becoming an important overseas investment power. For pertin-
ent statistics, see Philippe Gugler and Julien Chaisse, ‘Editors’ Introduction: Patterns and
Dynamics of Asia’s Growing Share of FDI’, in Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia –
Strategic and Policy Challenges (London: Routledge, 2009) at 4–7.
2 Markus Ja¨ger, Will the BRICs (Read: China) Really Become the New Global Growth Engine?,
26 September 2009, VOX, available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4026 (visited
5 December 2010).
3 See Chinese Minister: World Bank Reform Benefits World Development, 26 April 2010, Xinhua,
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-04/26/c_13267705.htm
(‘China’s stake at the bank, in terms of voting power, rises from 2.78 percent to 4.42 percent.’)
(visited 1 May 2010).
4 WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry, WTO News: 2001 Press Releases,
Press/243, (17 September 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/
pr243_e.htm (visited 1 May 2010).
5 See e.g. Julia Ya Qin, ‘Trade, Investments and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on
China’s Legal System’, 191 China Quarterly 720 (2007); Karen Halverson Cross, ‘China’s
WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications’, 27 Boston Journal of
International and Comparative Law Review, 319 (2004); Qingjing Kong, ‘China’s WTO
Accession: Commitments and Implications’, 13 (4) Journal of International Economic Law
166 (2000); Sylvia A. Rhodes and John H. Jackson, ‘United States Law and China’s WTO
Accession Process’, 2 (3) Journal of International Economic Law 497 (1999).
6 See e.g. Hao Dong and Minkang Gu, ‘Copyrightable or Not: A Review of the Chinese
Provision on ‘‘Illegal Works’’ Targeted by WTO DS362 and Suggestions for Legal Reform’,
4 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 335 (2009); Julien Chaisse
and Laun Xinjie, ‘The CFS Case: Looking Back and Looking Forward’, 4 Global Trade and
Customs Journal 15 (2009); Donald P. Harris, ‘The Honeymoon is Over: Evaluating the
United States’ WTO Intellectual Property Complaint against China’, 32 Fordham
International Law Journal 801 (2008).
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a different approach by examining legal and institutional positions that indi-
cate a significant shift in China’s behavior within and toward the WTO. Its
purpose is to show why and how China’s skeptical attitude toward interna-
tional law and tribunals has transformed to an ‘assertive legalism’ strategy in
the WTO arena. To deter escalating cases initiated by the US, the European
Union and developing countries that follow their lead, China has endeavored
to build its legal capacity to handle WTO litigation. To bridge the legal
expertise gap, China has strengthened public–private cooperation by estab-
lishing think tanks, known as WTO centers, to link local industries with the
central government. To train Chinese WTO lawyers, China not only requires
international law firms to work with Chinese firms in handling major dis-
putes, but also engages local firms to participate in third-party cases. This
‘learning by doing’ approach has increased WTO legal capacity within the
Chinese government and local law firms, thus enhancing China’s ‘WTO
bar’. During China’s 10-year WTO membership, the country has become
increasingly active in WTO rule-making by submitting proposals to revise
WTO rules and by appointing Chinese nationals to WTO bodies. China has
also shifted from having a passive attitude to acting preemptively in its liti-
gation approach, as demonstrated by a series of complaints that China filed
against the US and the European Union from 2007 to 2010. China’s WTO
experience is important to other emerging economies and to the multilateral
trading system.
This article enriches the current literature on this topic for three reasons.
First, it provides a case study regarding WTO legal capacity building in
China, which is both a major developing country and an emerging economic
superpower. To have been able to understand the challenges that China has
encountered, the results of this article reflect a 3-year investigation based on
original sources, as well as interviews and discussions with government offi-
cials, trade lawyers and academics. These individuals are Chinese and for-
eign experts who have first-hand experience with China’s dealings with WTO
affairs while working in their various capacities in Beijing, Shanghai, Geneva
and Washington, DC. Secondly, China’s experience offers valuable lessons
for developing countries that face similar obstacles. These countries include
those in the process of acceding to the WTO (e.g. Russia, Iran and Laos)
and those that have joined the WTO yet lack substantial WTO experience
(e.g. Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam). To some extent, these counties are
comparable to China, as their embedded political structures invariably clash
with cardinal free trade principles. China’s experience in handling these
clashes is thus important to them. Finally, the US and the European
Union have adopted an offense-oriented strategy toward trade ligation
against China. This research will help them gain a sounder understanding
of political and institutional barriers jeopardizing China’s compliance with its
WTO commitments. It also demonstrates China’s litigation strategy in the
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WTO and assesses whether China’s capacity-building efforts may turn the
balance of power in global trade.
This article comprises five parts. Part II examines the emergence of inter-
national economic study in China and its impact on China’s development of
expertise in international law. In particular, it explains how the country has
shifted to a focus that enhances it legal capacity in handling trade litigation
in the WTO. Part III identifies weaknesses in China’s current legal education
system and government structures that hinder its legal capacity building. It
also provides an analysis of the government’s approach to strengthening
public–private cooperation by establishing local think tanks and retaining
international trade law and local firms to assist the government in WTO
disputes. Part IV offers insights into the Chinese government’s role in
WTO rule-making, and illustrates the evolution of China’s litigation strategy
in third-party, defensive and offensive cases and assesses the results of such
cases. Part V concludes the discussion with the major findings concerning
China’s WTO legal capacity building and an outline of lessons other
developing countries may learn from Chinese experiences.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW RESEARCH IN
CHINA
In order to understand China’s development of international economic law
expertise from a holistic point of view, one cannot ignore the history of the
country’s reception of international law. Chinese elites’ study of international
economic law and the practical application of knowledge in international
organizations, including the WTO, signify a new milestone for China’s en-
trance into the family of nations. This milestone also represents a shift in the
Chinese attitude toward international law and, more notably, international
dispute settlement mechanisms. From the Chinese perspective, while the
admission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the United
Nations (UN) acknowledges its legitimacy as the ‘real’ China, the country’s
WTO membership further affirms its ascended status on par with Western
powers.7
A. Trade matters and China’s exposure to international law
China was by no means unfamiliar with trade matters. In fact, the mounting
pressure that Western powers exerted on China to open trade in the 19th
7 The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and international law scholars often
address the previous Republic of China (ROC) government, which relocated to Taiwan in
1949, as the ‘old’ China. For two decades, the PRC and the ROC vied for representation of
China and, in 1971, the PRC ‘restored’ its seat in the UN. For relevant legal issues and
historical backgrounds, see Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘An Unrecognized State in Foreign and
International Courts: The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan’, 28(4) Michigan
Journal of International Law 765 (2007), at 768–69.
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century first exposed the ancient kingdom to the modern international legal
regime. Yet, China’s experience with international law was initially frustrat-
ing. China failed to deter Britain from importing opium into the country on
the basis of international law. China’s defeat in the Opium War by the British
compelled its leaders to sign the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, which was the
prelude to a series of ‘unequal treaties’ with Western powers that led to
China’s century of humiliation. Ironically, the text of these treaties to
some extent reflects modern-day WTO principles. The Treaty of Nanjing,
for instance, requested that China abolish the ‘monopolistic system of trade’,
promise the ‘opening [of] ports . . . to British consuls and merchants’, and the
use of ‘a fixed tariff ’.8 Most of the subsequent treaties also demanded uni-
lateral ‘Most-Favoured-Nation’ (MFN) treatment, obliging China to grant
whatever rights it conceded to the other powers under their treaties
with China.9 This unpleasant history explains why the Chinese perceived
international law as ‘reasonable but unreliable’ and how the WTO-plus ob-
ligations to which China committed often led to a reminiscence of discrim-
inatory treatment under past unequal treaties.10
China’s traditional attitude toward international law certainly influenced
its approach to international disputes. From the Ching Dynasty to the be-
ginnings of the PRC, China consistently refrained from appearing before
any international courts and preferred negotiations over any form of binding
decisions rendered by ‘biased’ courts dominated by the West.11 This atti-
tude was compounded by the PRC’s Marxist–Leninist ideology that
stressed the inviolability of sovereignty free from intervention of bourgeois
8 See Immanuel C. Y. Hsu¨, The Rise of Modern China (6th edn, New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), at 199 (citing the text of the Treaty of Nanjing).
9 For example, the unilateral MFN treatment was included in the Treaty of the Bogue with the
UK (1843), the Treaty of Wangxia with the US (1844) and Treaty of Whampoa with France
(1844). The unilateral MFN treatment is distinguishable from the MFN principle under
Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as the former does not
oblige Western powers to accord China benefits under their trade agreements.
10 See Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People’s China and International Law: A
Documentary Study (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), at 10 (citing comments
by Tsui Kuo-ing, an early Chinese diplomat, in 1891). WTO-plus obligations refer to pro-
visions in China’s Protocol of Accession that mandate more stringent requirements than those
imposed on other WTO members. For information on China’s WTO-plus obligations, see
Julia Ya Qin, ‘‘WTO-Plus’’ Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade
Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol’, 37 (3) Journal
of World Trade 483 (2003), at 491–509.
11 For instance, the Ching government rejected Portugal’s request to refer Macao-related bound-
ary disputes to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1909, the ROC refused to appear before
the Permanent Court of International Justice concerning the termination of the 1865 China–
Belgium treaty in 1926, and the PRC rejected India’s proposal to resolve China–India bound-
ary disputes through a arbitral tribunal in the 1960s. Ibid, at 11; Hungdah Chiu, Xiang Dai
Guo Ji Fa, [Modern International Law] (2nd edn, Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2008), at
972–73 (in Chinese); Zho Gengshen, Guo Ji Fa, [International Law] (2nd edn, Wuhan: Wuhan
University Press, 2007) at 667–68 (in Chinese).
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imperialism.12 The PRC’s entry into the UN in 197113 and its appointment
of national judges to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) since 198514
marked the beginning of the slow transformation of its attitude toward sol-
ving international disputes. This new trend, which influenced legal academia,
can be illustrated by the establishment of Peking University Department of
Law’s international law section in 1979 and the Chinese Society of
International Law in 1980.15 China’s first authoritative textbook on
12 For details on the Chinese concept of sovereignty, see Shan Wenhua, ‘Redefining the Chinese
Concept of Sovereignty’, in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds) China and the New
International Order (Abindon, New York: Routledge, 2008) at 57–9.
13 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 replaced the ROC with the PRC.
14 PRC judges of the ICJ include Ni Zhengyu (1985–94), Shi Jiuyong (1994–2010) and Xue
Hanqin (2010–present). Prior to them, Chinese judges, nominated by the ROC, sitting on
international courts included Wang Chonghui (1921–39) and Zheng Tianxi (1939–46) of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, and Hsu Mo (1946–57) and Wellington Koo
(1957–67) of the ICJ and Mei Ju-ao (1946–48) of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East. Other PRC judges of international courts include Zhang Yuejiao (2008–present)
of the WTO Appellate Body, Zhao Lihai (1996–2000) and Gao Zhiguo (2008–present) of the
International Tribunals for the Law of the Sea and Wang Tieya (1997–2000) of International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Appellate Body Members, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm (visited 2 May 2010); PRC
judges of the ICJ include Ni Zhengyu (1985–94), Shi Jiuyong (1994–2010) and Xue Hanqin
(2010–present). The Court: All Members, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index
.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=2&PHPSESSID=4eda12aa412deb18efcd30875d7a3156 (5 December
2010). Prior to them, Chinese judges, nominated by the ROC, sitting on international courts
include Wang Chonghui (1921–39) and Zheng Tianxi (1939–46) of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, and Hsu Mo (1946–57) and Wellington Koo (1957–67) of the ICJ and
Mei Ju-ao (1946–48) of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Id.; International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, available at http://www.absoluteastronomy.
com/topics/International_Military_Tribunal_for_the_Far_East (visited 1 May 2010). Other
PRC judges of international courts include Yuejiao Zhang (2008–present) of the WTO
Appellate Body, Zhao Lihai (1996–2000) and Gao Zhiguo (2008–present) of the
International Tribunals for the Law of the Sea and Wang Tieya (1997–2000) of
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Appellate Body Members, avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm (visited 2 May
2010); General Information – Judges, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (visited
1 May 2010); and Former ICTY Judge Wang Tieya Dies Aged 89, CC/PIS/722-e (15 January
2003), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8314 (visited 10 October 2010); and Former ICTY
Judge Wang Tieya Dies Aged 89, CC/PIS/722-e (15 January 2003), available at http://www
.icty.org/sid/8314 (visited 1 May 2010).
15 Wang Tieya, ‘Teaching and Research of International Law in Present Day China’, 22
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 77 (1983–84), at 78–9; Introduction to the Chinese
Society of International Law, available at http://www.csil.cn/1frontpages/indexes/csilFrameset-1
.html (visited 1 May 2010). The China Political Science and Law Association that repre-
sented the PRC in the International Law Association (ILA) withdrew its membership to
protest the admission of the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law, based in
Taipei. See Hungdah Chiu, ‘Communist China’s Attitude toward International Law’, 60
American Journal of International Law 245 (1966), at 263 (explaining China’s study of
international law). Currently, the PRC has no representation in the ILA, although Chinese
individuals have joined the ILA as members of the headquarter offices or the Hong Kong
branch.
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international law, authored by an eminent Chinese scholar, Zhou
Gengsheng, was published in 1976.16
The Chinese approach to international law in the 1970s can be categorized
as ‘reception with silent participation’. During this era, the PRC did not
challenge the normative validity of international law, but frequently ques-
tioned the universal application of such law.17 China’s sensitivity concerning
its sovereignty did not decrease, and the Cold War conflict also made China
hesitant to resolve disputes before international tribunals, let alone submit-
ting to courts that mandate compulsory jurisdiction.18 Active participation in
rule-making, in either political or economic arenas, was not Beijing’s
concern.
B. International economic law as a new discipline
The economic reform that Deng Xiaoping commenced in 1978 resulted in a
significant increase in foreign trade. Traditional international law research
that concentrated on sovereignty, recognition and state succession was not
adequate to meet China’s need to understand new trade law issues. The
academic debate on whether international economic law should be separate
from public international law first appeared in the 1983 Zhong Guo Guo
Ji Fa Nian Kan (Chinese Yearbook of International Law).19 The debate
caused the government to grant international economic law status as a new
academic discipline independent of public international law.20 In 1987, the
16 This book entitled ‘Guo Ji Fa [International Law] (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976)’
was based on Zhou’s earlier works, including presumably the earliest book on international
law written in Chinese, ‘Guo Ji Fa Da Gang [International Law Outline] (Shanghai: The
Commercial Press, 1929)’. These books focus on public international law issues and do not
address international economic law.
17 See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd edn, New York: Columbia University Press,
1979) at 45 (asserting that even in the Maoist era, China ‘did not seek to destroy or remake
international law. Indeed, it invoked international law and acquiesced in its authority. . .’.);
Chiu, above n 15, at 256 (observing that Chinese scholars viewed international law as divided
into multiple systems that govern socialist and bourgeois states, respectively).
18 In 1972, the PRC notified the UN Secretary-General that it did not recognize the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction that the ROC accepted in 1946. It should be noted that the backdrop
of China’s political ideology led to its international law practice. The major goal of the PRC’s
foreign diplomacy was to pursue the legitimacy of its regime by replacing Taiwan in as many
international organizations as possible.
19 See Zhang Hui, Zhongguo Guoji Faxue Sanshinian (1978-2008 nian) [Thirty Years of Chinese
Scholarship on International Economic Law: 1978–2008], 11 Wuda Guojifa Pinlun [Wuhan
International Law Review], at 276, 278, fn 2 (explaining scholars’ views on whether interna-
tional economic law should be considered as a sub-area of public international law) (2009)
(in Chinese).
20 It means that similar resources designated to international law research would be designated to
international economic law. China’s education authorities listed international economic law as
a separate legal subject from international law in 1982, but merged public international law,
international economic law and private international law as a subject entitled ‘international
law’ in 1997. Ibid, at 278. The issue of whether particular legal subjects can be recognized by
the government affects whether a law school can offer degrees with the specializations.
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Chinese Society of International Economic Law was established.21 It is now
based at Xiamen University and has been a major impetus for the diffusion of
international economic law. Not only has it held annual national conferences
since 1992, but it has also published the Guo Ji Jing Ji Fa Lun Cong (Journal
of International Economic Law) in Chinese since 1998, and it is considered
to be an authoritative academic journal in China.22
With the publication of China’s first textbook on international economic
law, written by Professor Liu Ding of Renmin University in 1984,23 this new
discipline soon attracted law scholars of the new generation. During the
1980s, most manuscripts on international economic law addressed the pri-
vate side of international economic law with a focus on trade terms, con-
tracts, investments, taxation and maritime law.24 This academic focus
occurred because Chinese enterprises often encountered private international
economic law issues. WTO research was not a priority because Beijing did
not plan to accede to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
until the early 1980s. In addition, with the government’s support, Peking
University began offering an LLM program with a concentration on inter-
national economic law in 1981 and Xiamen University established a PhD
program on this subject in 1986.25
The emergence and development of international economic law in China
during the economic reform period not only paved the way for WTO re-
search, but also influenced the government’s approach to international law.
21 Zhongquo Guoji Jingji Faxuehui Dashiji [Chronology of the Chinese Society of International
Economic Law], available at http://www.csiel.org/lsyg.asp (visited 1 May 2010) (in Chinese).
The idea for establishing the CSIEL was proposed by the participants at the International
Economic Law Seminar, sponsored by five academic institutions, in Jiangxi in 1984. Ibid.
The International Economic Law Research Association of the China Law Society, the second
nation-wide association devoted to international economic law research, was established in
Beijing in 2005. Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Liu Ding, Guo Ji Jing Ji Fa [International Economic Law] (Beijing: China Renmin University
Press, 1984). Cheng An of Xiamen University, the Editor in Chief of China’s Guo Ji Jing Ji
Fa Lun Cong [Journal of International Economic Law], also published a series of authoritative
textbooks on international economic law. In addition, various international law textbooks
include discussions on international economic law. For instance, ‘Guo Ji Fa [International
Law]’ (Beijing: Law Press China, 1995), a standard textbook adopted by Chinese law schools
was edited by Wang Tieya, and includes Chapter 15: International Economic Law, authored
by Wang Guiguo of City University of Hong Kong.
24 For example, Chen An of Xiamen University published the first series of textbooks in China
that focus on various subtopics of international economic law, including Guoji Maoyi Fa
[International Trade Law], Guoji Touzi Fa [International Investment Law], Guoji Huobi
Jinrong Fa [International Monetary and Financial Law], Guoji Sui Fa [International Tax
Law] and Guoji Haishi Fa [International Maritime Law]. Kecheng Jianjie [Introductory
Curriculum], available at http://xmujpkc.xmu.edu.cn/gjjjfx/index.asp (visited 1 May 2010)
(in Chinese). The textbook edited by Chen, Guoji Jinji Faxue [International Economic
Law] (4th edn, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007), remains an authoritative textbook
in China.
25 Zhang, above n 19, at 279.
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First, China’s public and private sectors prior to the 1980s were isolated
from the global arena and had limited interest in following international
rules. However, the economic reform compelled Chinese businesses to inter-
act with rules governing transnational commercial transactions. The prag-
matic needs of the private sector to understand such rules generated the
government’s interest in these ‘Western’ rules. The official attitude change
was also reflected in the incorporation of international rules into Chinese
laws.26 Thirdly, China no longer viewed international law as a set of rules
that contain multiple systems governing capitalist and socialist states, re-
spectively. This ‘unity’ of international law facilitated Chinese acquiescence
to such law and decreased China’s challenges to the fairness of multilateral
tribunals. It can be exemplified by the 1998 Sino–Barbadian Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT), in which China for the first time agreed to allow
foreign investors to resort to international arbitral tribunals without specific
consent from the Chinese government.27 Finally, China’s development of
international economic law boosted the international law research capacity
in academic institutions in newly developed coastal cities in the South,
including Xiamen University. This development widened international eco-
nomic law research, and scholars studied new topics that included the PRC’s
trade relations with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asian nations.
C. WTO legal capacity building as a priority
A new period for China’s economic development began in the late 1980 s
because the government started to negotiate its accession to the GATT and
finally gained WTO membership in 2001.28 The focus of international eco-
nomic law research soon shifted to GATT/WTO rules. Unlike the preceding
26 For instance, the PRC’s contract law is mostly consistent with the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG). Given the treaty-friendly language in Article 142 of the
PRC’s General Principles of the Civil Law, the CISG was also part of the applicable rules.
27 Shan, above n 12, at 63. This new model is also reflected in subsequent BITs with Western
states, although dispute settlement mechanisms under these BITs have not been invoked as of
today. See Wenhua, above n 12, fns 72–3, at 77 (listing China’s BITs with Germany, Finland,
the Netherlands and other states). The PRC joined the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (Washington Convention)
in 1993. Nonetheless, prior to the 1998 Sino–Barbadian BIT, the matters that could be
submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) were
limited and a specific consent to the jurisdiction was required for each case.
28 Based on the official report submitted to the State Council in 1982, Beijing ‘formally applied
for the restoration of its contracting party status in GATT in 1986 and the Working Party on
China was set up by GATT in 1987 to deal with the related issues’. China and World Trade
Organization (WTO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (15 November
2000), available at http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2616/t15330.htm (visited).
For information on the impact of the PRC’s UN membership on its accession to the GATT/
WTO, see Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘Facing China: Taiwan’s Status as a Separate Customs Territory in
the World Trade Organization’, 39 (6) Journal of World Trade 1195 (2005), at 1196–99.
During the 1990s, 1997 is a noteworthy year because China passed the first anti-dumping
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period, in which compliance with multilateral trade rules was largely con-
sidered to be the concern of private enterprises, the Chinese government
started to adopt a relatively active role. There are several reasons for this
change. First, the Chinese government realized that Chinese companies
would encounter barriers when attempting to export goods due to the ab-
sence of government involvement. The prime example is the Multi Fibre
Arrangement (MFA), which imposed quotas on the volume of textiles that
developing countries could export to developed countries. China realized
that its growing textile industry would be harmed if the government did
not get the quotas under the MFA. Hence, in addition to signing bilateral
textile agreements with some trading partners in the 1970 s, Beijing sent an
observer to attend the GATT meeting where the renewal of the MFA was
discussed in 1981.29 This move, along with China’s formal MFA member-
ship in 1983,30 was the beginning of the country’s participation in following
and negotiating global trade rules.
Secondly, the potential conflict between China’s communist ideology and
‘presumable’ market economy was removed. This occurred because the
Communist Party’s 14th National Congress in 1992 passed a resolution to
ensure an economic reform under ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’.31
This rubric was incorporated into the amendment to the PRC Constitution
in the following year.32 From an official standpoint, China’s market economy
does not equate with capitalism. Following this logic, the government would
actively participate in global trade to strengthen Chinese socialism rather
than succumb to the Western capitalist ideology. Finally, and most import-
antly, pursuant to the WTO’s ‘single undertaking’ approach,33 China’s mem-
bership obliges the country to accept the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. This is fundamental to the development of
rule (the first GATT/WTO-type trade law that China adopted) and initiated the first
anti-dumping case against foreign products.
29 For example, China singed the textile agreement with the European Economic Community in
1979; Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, China’s Participation in the IMF, the World
Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of
Michigan Press, 1990) at 84.
30 Ibid.
31 Zhongguo Gonchangdang Dishisici Quanguo Daibiao Dahui [14th National Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/con-
tent_697129.htm (visited 1 May 2010) (in Chinese).
32 See Amendment Two (Approved on 29 March 1993, by the 8th NPC at its 1st Session),
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted on 4 December, 1982), available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (visited 1 May 2010) (stating
that the Preamble was to ‘be amended as: ‘‘China is at the primary stage of socialism. The
basic task of the nation is, according to the theory of building socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics, to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization . . . .’’ ’) (emphasis added).
33 See How the Negotiations Are Organized, World Trade Organization, available at http://www
.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm (visited 1 May 2010) (‘Virtually every
item of the negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed
separately.’) (visited 1 May 2010).
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international law in China because the WTO is the only international ‘court’
with compulsory jurisdiction that China accepted, and it is the only tribunal
to which it has actually resorted. This is distinguishable from the preceding
period when China’s BITs allowed only ‘private parties’ to have access to
arbitration tribunals.
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism directly calls for enhanced WTO
capacity building. In the initial years after China’s accession, China’s major
trade partners gave China leeway in implementing its commitments and did
not initiate complaints against China.34 As Figure 1 shows, due to their
rapidly growing trade deficits with China, these partners adopted a more
aggressive attitude in WTO litigation. In 2004, the US filed the very first
WTO case against China, challenging its exemption of value-added tax on
domestically produced integrated circuits.35 This case shocked the Chinese
government and academia, and motivated them to reach a consensus to
increase China’s capacity in dealing with WTO litigation. They predicted
that WTO complaints against China would be the norm rather than an
exception. This prediction proved to be accurate because as of June 2010,
five countries—the US, the European Union, Canada, Guatemala and
Mexico—have initiated 18 complaints against China.36
Remarkably, in 2007, China filed its first WTO complaint without any
co-complainants, challenging countervailing and antidumping duties that the
US imposed on Chinese paper-product manufacturers.37 All of the seven
cases that China has initiated were directed against the US and the
Figure 1. China as a complainant and respondent in WTO cases (as of 1 July 2010)
34 See Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘China–United States Trade Negotiations and Disputes: The WTO and
Beyond’, 4 (2) Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 369 (2009),
at 375–7 (providing an overview of the US trade policy on China).
35 China - Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, DS309. China decided to settle this case and
withdraw WTO-inconsistent measures. For details, see data available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds309_e.htm (visited 2 May 2010).
36 DS309, 339, 340, 342, 358, 359, 362, 363, 372, 373, 378, 387, 388, 390, 394, 395, 398 and
407.
37 US – Preliminary Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet
Paper from China, DS368. The 2002 US–Steel Safeguards case, DS252, was the first case for
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European Union,38 China’s two major export markets. Beijing’s litigation
approach is aimed at overcoming the significant number of trade-remedy
cases against Chinese enterprises. It also sought ‘new’ interpretations of
those WTO-plus or discriminatory obligations to which China committed
in exchange for WTO membership.39 The transition of the government
mindset in resorting to legal remedies also affected Chinese businesses,
which had always avoided resolving disputes through the courts. For ex-
ample, in Tza Yap Shum v Peru, Chinese investors for the first time sued a
foreign government at the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) in 2007.40
The importance of the WTO prompted government officials and legal
academics to make studying the WTO a priority on China’s international
economic law research agenda. Translations of books from Western WTO
experts helped domestic scholars gain a better understanding of the oper-
ation of the new organization. For example, Professor John H. Jackson’s
book, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations, was translated into Chinese and published in 2001.41 This book
provides an overview of cardinal WTO principles and, in particular,
addresses issues that China may encounter. In addition to reading
which China sued the US, but China was one of the eight complainants challenging the US’s
safeguard measures on imports of steel products.
38 DS252, 368, 379, 392, 397, 399 and 405.
39 These discriminatory treatments primarily arise from China’s acceptance of its status as a
non-market economy in the Protocol of Accession. See US–China Bilateral WTO Agreement,
15 November 2009, available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/WTO-Conf-1999/fact-
sheets/fs-004.html (visited 2 May 2010) (explaining that under the US–China WTO
Bilateral Agreement, ‘the United States can continue to apply our current non-market econ-
omy methodology in antidumping cases involving imports from China for 15 years’); On
China’s Non Market Economy, G-IPR Global Research Center, 25 May 2009, available at
http://www.giprs.org/node/464 (visited 3 May 2010) (stating that under China’s protocol, ‘the
surrogate markets for purposes of arriving at the normal value often are India, Turkey and
Mexico, which usually is the very reason why China’s anti-dumping cases end in failures.’).
China has attempted to solicit its important trade partners, many of which are FTA partners,
to recognize its market-economic status. See Qingjiang Kong, ‘Trade Disputes between China
and the EU: Are They Manageable?’, 5 (2) Global Trade and Customs Journal 47 (2010), 51
(‘[China] has acquired market economy recognition from New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Kyrgyzstan but is awaiting approval from the US and the EC, its biggest
trading partners.’).
40 Tza Yap Shum v Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 (China/Peru BIT) – Decision on
Jurisdiction and Competence, 19 June 2009, paras 1–29. Although Chinese businesses have
frequently resorted to foreign courts for legal remedies, the Chinese government was reluctant
to participate in foreign legal proceedings. A significant change to this governmental attitude
is the countervailing duty-related Coated Free-Sheet Paper case, in which the Chinese gov-
ernment, for the first time, under its name, filed a lawsuit against the US Department of
Commerce in a US court. Scott M. Berry, ‘When Tariffs Encourage Free Trade’, Asia Times,
7 August 2007, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/IH07Cb02.html
(visited 3 May 2010).
41 Jackson’s book was translated by Zhang Naigen of Fudan University and published by the
Fudan University Press in China.
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publications that introduce the WTO,42 Chinese scholars also focus on
WTO dispute settlement cases, particularly those involving trade remedies.43
Because the WTO is the only multilateral organization in which China co-
exists with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, publications that discuss legal
issues involving ‘one country, four seats’ also proliferated.44
China’s keen interest in the WTO also increased the demand for experts in
relevant fields and its academic institutions have responded. Currently, sev-
eral law schools have established graduate institutes of international econom-
ic law, which offer graduate degrees on WTO subjects.45 Wuhan University
and the Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade even launched independent
colleges of WTO specifically devoted to research and teaching of relevant
disciplines.46 The China–EU School of Law, financed by the European
42 For example, Zhao Weitian, Shi Mao Zuzhi (WTO) De Falu Zhidu [The Legal System of the
WTO] (Chang Chun: Jilin People Press, 2000) and Yang Guohua, Zhongquo Jiaru WTO Falu
Wenti Zhuanlun [Legal Problems on China’s Accession to the WTO] (Beijing: Law Press
China, 2003).
43 For example, Ji Wenhua and Jiang Liyong, WTO Zhengduan Jiejue Guize Yu Zhongguo De
Shijian [WTO Dispute Settlement Rules and China’s Practices] (Beijing: Peking University
Press, 2005), Zhu Lanye, Shijie Maoyi Zuzhi Guoji Maoyi Jiufen Anli Pingxi 2003–06 [Case
Analysis of the WTO International Trade Disputes: 2003–06] (Beijing: Law Press China,
2007), Zhang Naigen, WTO Zhengduan Jiejue Jizhi Lun – Yi TRIPS Xieding Weili [On
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism – TRIPS Agreement As Example] (Shanghai:
Shanghai People Press, 2007), and Gong Baihua, WTO Zhengduan Jiejue Yu Zhongquo
[WTO Dispute Settlement & China] (Shanghai: Shanghai People Press, 2009).
44 For example, Sun Wangzhong and Zhao Xueqing, Rushihou Yiguosixi Redian Falu Wenti Yanjiu
[Studies on Hot Legal Issues Related to ‘One Country, Four Seat’ After China’s Accession
into The WTO] (Beijing: Law Press China, 2004) and ‘Hai Xia Liang An WTO Fa Lu Lun
Tan’ Lun Wen Ji [Proceedings of ‘Cross-Strait WTO Law Forum’] (Beijing: Peking University
Press, Sun Wangzhong ed. 2007). As the WTO is the least sensitive international law-related
topic, cross-strait academic conferences often focus on WTO-related issues. For instance, the
Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law and Chinese universities organized the
Cross-Strait WTO Law Forum in Beijing in 2007 and the first Cross-Strait International
Law Forum in Taipei in 2009. Consequently, WTO research also increases exchanges be-
tween international law scholars in China and Taiwan.
45 Eg China University of Political Science and Law, Nanjing University of Finance and
Economics, Nankai University, Northwest University of Politics and Law, Peking University
and Xiamen University. Currently, 17 Chinese universities have graduate institutes of inter-
national law, most of which also have faculty members who focus research on WTO law.
Peking University and China University of Politics and Law have both graduate institutes of
international law and international economic law.
46 Wuhan University’s WTO Studies School was established in 1999 and offers masters degrees
specifically on WTO law. Introduction to College, available at http://www.whuwto.com/Index-
listdetail-pid-3 (visited 1 May 2010) (in Chinese). Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade’s
School of WTO Research & Education was established in 2002, and in 2010 the school
was designated by the WTO as one of the 14 academic partners for the WTO Chairs
Program. School of WTO Research & Education, available at http://www.shift.edu.cn/
home/wtoxy/index.htm (visited 2 May 2010); WTO Academic Cooperation: WTO to estab-
lish chairs at 14 developing country universities, Press/593, 26 January 2010, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres10_e/pr593_e.htm (visited 3 May 2010). Peking
University’s Institute of the Chinese Economy and WTO Studies was also established
under the Guanghua School of Management in 2002. Introduction to the Institute, available
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Union, also started the Master of European and International Law program,
which made WTO law compulsory.47 Foreign institutions have also contrib-
uted to China’s WTO legal capacity. Since China’s WTO accession, foreign
governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international
organizations have funded various training projects for Chinese officials.48
But, as discussed in the next section, the proliferation of these programs has
not yet efficiently increased China’s WTO legal capacity in dealing with
actual litigation.
Foreign contributions, particularly those funded by business associations,
may not be entirely altruistic. WTO-related training events aim at ‘teaching’
officials how to implement WTO rules. This is important for foreign com-
panies because the major problem they encounter in China has more to do
with enforcement than the law. This is particularly true concerning intellec-
tual property enforcement at the local level. From the business perspective,
it is often the last resort to request that the home government initiate
WTO litigation, given the time and resources that may be incurred.
Consequently, the WTO training projects for Chinese officials could
defuse potential WTO disputes at a much lower cost. Moreover, these
events provided public relations opportunities by allowing foreign businesses
leaders to interact with Chinese officials in charge of trade policy and
large-scale government projects. As China is not yet a party to the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement and hence not bound by its national
treatment and MFN obligations, multilateral enterprises clearly understand
the importance of building guanxi—personal connections—with government
officials.
III. PUBLIC—PRIVATE COOPERATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The analysis above provides evidence of China’s new attitude toward inter-
national law and dispute settlement that has evolved from rejection, to re-
ception, and finally to participation. Such involvement has been both
politically and economically motivated. Although the Chinese notion of
at http://wto.gsm.pku.edu.cn/cn/background.htm (visited 10 May 2010) (in Chinese). This
institute focuses on WTO research and does not offer degrees.
47 The China–EU School of Law is under the China University of Political Science and Law.
Master of European and International Law at the China-EU School of Law in Beijing, at 6,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/links/china/docs/cesl_european_master.pdf (visited 2
May 2010).
48 The sponsors were the government agencies and embassies of the US, EU, UK, Germany,
Australia and Japan; NGOs including the US–China Business Council, the Ford Foundation,
and the Asian Foundation; and international organizations included the Asian Development
Bank, the World Bank; and educational institutions, such as Georgetown University and
Harvard University Kennedy School of Government. Brian L. Goldstein and Stephen J.
Anderson, ‘Foreign Contributions to China’s WTO Capacity Building’, The China
Business Review 9, at 10–11 (January–February 2002).
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sovereignty in the political sphere (in particular, territorial integrity) has
altered marginally in past decades, the perception with regard to economic
sovereignty has significantly changed, thereby facilitating China’s integration
into the global order. The WTO has undoubtedly played a pivotal role in this
transformation.
A. The de-linking of legal education from the practice of WTO law
As examined in Part II, the pragmatic need to understand the WTO galva-
nized the Chinese government and academic institutions to respond to such
demands. Publications and academic programs have increased the focus on
WTO research. Yet, China’s WTO legal capacity still lagged behind other
emerging economies, such as India and Brazil. A preliminary question is why
Chinese legal education does not seem to be capable of producing WTO
lawyers.49 I offer the following explanations.
First, Chinese law schools focus primarily on the doctrinal understanding
rather than the application of legal subjects. In other words, vast educational
resources were invested to make students ‘understand’ WTO law, but not
to enable them to ‘practice’ the law. For instance, WTO-related courses
often include the study of panel and Appellate Body reports, but rarely
teach legal research and writing. WTO litigation is highly dependent on
one’s proficiency in oral and written English. In cases involving the US
and the European Union, a solid understanding of their respective trade
regimes and pertinent cases is a prerequisite. However, legal English
and foreign law research training, including the use of legal databases
such as Westlaw or Lexis, are rather constrained in Chinese law schools.50
This deficiency is also because most students in non-elite schools outside
major cities have limited access to legal databases, law reporters and digests
or libraries of international law including WTO subjects. Moreover, the
de facto common law approach in WTO jurisprudence is new to Chinese
instructors and students. This is not simply because of China’s civil
law system, but because most local courts’ decisions are not publicly avail-
able and are rarely taught in schools. In addition to improving the country’s
fundamental legal mentality and infrastructure, an efficient way to address
the shortfall may be to incorporate global moot court competitions into
legal education. These competitions, including the Philip C. Jessup
International Law Moot Court Competition and the ELSA Moot Court
49 See Tina Wang, ‘Where Are China’s WTO Lawyers?’, Forbes, 27 April 2009, available at http://
www.forbes.com/2009/04/27/china-wto-law-business-economy-trade.html (visited 3 May
2010) (discussing the lack of WTO lawyers in Chinese firms).
50 For example, Roy L. Sturgeon, Teaching and International Legal Research at Wuhan University
(Wuda) Law School 6 (2010), available on SSRN (describing that law students at Wuhan
University, a leading school in China, are not familiar with basic research tools for Westlaw).
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Competition on WTO Law,51 model cases heard before the ICJ and the
WTO, and would allow participants to develop research, writing and oral
argument skills.
Secondly, the lack of ‘practical’ WTO training has been compounded by
the fact that Chinese law professors usually possess no work experience prior
to beginning their academic careers. A small number of WTO law professors
have developed trade law expertise through taking on occasional projects
from government agencies or their affiliations with WTO think tanks.52
However, the Chinese government has frequently requested advisory opin-
ions from them, offering them only limited remuneration. The official ex-
pectation is that law professors are public officials, and providing assistance
to the government is an honor or political responsibility.53 This mentality,
along with underpaying them for legal services, has significantly diminished
academics’ motivation to participate in WTO litigation. Finally, although it is
increasingly common for Chinese law students to pursue graduate degrees at
Western law schools, these graduates do not plan to enter the government.
For example, none of the former Chinese interns at the WTO Legal Affairs
Division and Appellate Body Secretariat pursued a public career, notwith-
standing their expertise in the field.54 In addition, most overseas Chinese law
51 The Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition was introduced into China
in 2003. Introduction to Competition, available at http://www.jessupchina.org/ (visited 2 May
2010) (in Chinese). China has not sent teams to participate in the ELSA Moot Court
Competition on WTO Law organized by the European Law Students’ Association. The
Asia Regional Round of this competition has been organized by National Taiwan
University College of Law in Taipei. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have participated in the
competition.
52 For example, Gong Baihua is both Professor of International Law in the Fudan
University School of Law and the Director of Information at the Shanghai WTO Affairs
Consultation Center. In addition, Tsinghua Law School had an agreement with government
agencies under which junior faculty members could work in relevant agencies (e.g. Ministry of
Commerce) for one year and their service seniority would be recognized by the university.
The program ceased to function due to faculty members’ lack of interest. Meeting with
faculty members of Tsinghua Law School (names withheld) in Beijing, July 2009 (on file
with the author).
53 Zeng Lingliang, a Chinese WTO scholar, argues that the current practice of the government
complies with neither the international norm nor the market discipline and that legal fees for
academics should be comparable to those for private lawyers. Zeng Lingliang, ‘WTO Zheng
Duan Jie Jue Zhong De Fa Lu Fu Wu Yu Wo Guo De Dui Ce Ce [Legal Services in WTO Dispute
Settlement and China’s Reponse]’, in Zeng Lingliang (ed.), 21 Shijichu De Guojifa Yu Zhongguo
[International Law in the Early 21st Century and China] (Wuhan: Wuhan University Press,
2005) at 412–412 at 412.
54 As of today, four Chinese law school graduates/lawyers who interned with the Legal Affairs
Division (LAD) and Appellate Body Secretariat (ABS) that assist panelists and Appellate
Body members in dispute settlement cases include Yi Wang (former LAD intern; currently
an associate in the Shanghai office of Jones Day), Xiaoyi Tang (former LAD intern, currently
an associate in the Brussels office of Mayer Brown), Gangquio Wang (former LAD intern,
currently a SJD candidate at Harvard Law School) and Henry Gao (former ABS intern,
currently an associate professor of law at Singapore Management University). The WTO
Rules Division, which assists panelist in cases concerning anti-dumping, subsidies and
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students tend to join international law firms that focus on corporate work
instead of litigation, to which trade practice belongs.55 The fact that China’s
WTO legal capacity cannot benefit from these elite law graduates aggravates
the disengagement between the academia and the government’s handling of
WTO disputes.
B. The role of think tanks to bridge the information and communication
gaps
Due to the above-mentioned weaknesses, China’s legal education and aca-
demia have contributed more to the dissemination of knowledge about WTO
law than to the increase of the country’s legal capacity to handle WTO
disputes. To address the problem, local governments established think
tanks, known as WTO centers, to develop local WTO expertise and to
bridge the gaps between the government, academia and private companies.
These think tanks are governmental entities rather than independent NGOs.
Among the most prominent think tanks are the Shanghai WTO Affairs
Consultation Center, the Beijing WTO Affairs Center, the Shenzhen WTO
Affairs Center and the China–WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Center.56 These think tanks offer assistance to companies in which managers
and employees had limited knowledge of WTO rules and minimal access to
training courses offered by universities. These companies, usually of small
and medium stature, most frequently encounter trade-remedy measures in
export markets and do not know how to use the government resources.
safeguard matters, does not run a regular internship program. I do not know of any Chinese
interns formerly or currently with this Division.
55 It is increasingly popular for Chinese students to pursue JD degrees in US law schools and
seek to transfer from New York headquarter offices of their firms to Chinese branch
offices. Because US-qualified Chinese lawyers are considered as foreign lawyers and cannot
practice Chinese law in China, they mostly choose to be in corporate departments working
on M&A matters. In addition, most Chinese branch offices of US firms do not have litiga-
tion departments and thus it would be more difficult for US litigation lawyers to relocate to
China.
56 The first three centers were established by the Shanghai Municipal Government in 2000,
Beijing Municipal Government in 2001, and Shenzhen Municipal Government in 2002,
respectively. Introduction, available at http://www.sccwto.net/webpages/WebMessage
Action_indexList.action?menuorderno=3002&lang=en&menuid=4fa335cb-150e-4a90-bab2-
1884156c8eae&menucode=sccwto&messagecount=0 (visited 20 May 2010); About BAC/
WTO, available at http://en.bjwto.gov.cn/newshtml/06/20030707111804.asp, (visited 10
May 2010) 9 December 2009; Introduction to the Center, available at http://www.szwto.
gov.cn/news/AboutUs.aspx?id=7117, (visited 10 May 2010) 7 May, 2009. The China–
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Center was founded by the Shanghai Institute of
Foreign Trade and the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center in 2008. China
Launches First Research Center on WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, People’s Daily,
12 May, 2008, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90884/6408352
.html (visited 10 May 2010). At the provincial level, counterparts to WTO centers are gov-
ernment entities, usually named ‘WTO Section’ or the ‘Bureau of Foreign Trade’ of the
Commerce Commission or the Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation.
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Although the WTO centers receive subsidies for research projects from the
ministries of the central government, including the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM), they are primarily funded by provincial and municipal govern-
ments. What motivates these local governments to develop WTO expertise?
China’s WTO commitments require that both central and local governments
revamp their legal regimes. Local government agencies and people’s con-
gresses would, therefore, need advice on conforming local regulations to
WTO law, to which they have had little exposure. In addition, Beijing,
Shanghai and Shenzhen are the prime beneficiaries of China’s economic
reform. Companies located in these cities contribute a significant share of
taxes essential for the cities’ financial base. It is thus essential for local gov-
ernments to safeguard these companies’ economic interests by helping them
tackle trade barriers, both abroad and in China. There is an unwritten rule
that city leaders’ political career in either the bureaucracy or the Communist
Party depend predominantly on their performance in generating economic
growth, and this provides an extra incentive to enhance WTO legal capacity
at the local level.
WTO centers fill the information and communication gaps for those in
academia, industries and the government. They also, to some extent, substi-
tute for trade associations in other countries. First, by holding programs and
conferences, these centers disseminate WTO knowledge not just to students,
but also to government officials and entrepreneurs. 57 Their websites also
keep track of changes in foreign trade rules and WTO disputes involving
China. Secondly, WTO centers assist private companies with ‘identifying’
trade and investment barriers. While local companies may ‘describe’ these
barriers, they often do not know the technical WTO terms for such barriers
(e.g. ‘non-tariff barriers’), and this keeps them from expressing effectively the
unfair treatment to competent ministries.58 Legal experts at local WTO cen-
ters can ‘translate’ layman’s language into WTO jargon and submit the ma-
terials to the MOFCOM in Beijing.59 These materials are important to the
ministry, as they serve as background information for questions posed to
China’s trading partners during WTO trade policy reviews. The information
can also be included in the Foreign Market Access Report, which helps the
57 For example, the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center runs the ‘50/100 Senior
Expertise Training Project on WTO Affairs’ and the Shenzhen WTO Affairs Center runs
the ‘9090 Training Project’ for government officials. Yu Minyou and Liao Li, Zhongwai WTO
Peixun Jiguo Yu Xianmu Gailan [An Overview of Chinese and Foreign WTO Training
Institutions and Projects], in Sun Wanzhong and Yu Minyou (eds), WTOFA Yu Zhongguo
Luncong [WTO Law and China Forum] (Beijing: Intellectual Property Press, 2008), 390–406
at 402–403. These two centers also regularly recruit post-doctoral researchers for their re-
search and consultation projects.
58 Email from a former member of the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center (name
withheld), 15 September 2009 (on file with the author).
59 For example, the Shenzhen WTO Affairs Center includes the Shenzhen Trade Barrier
Complaint and Investigation Services Center.
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ministry identify foreign ‘unfair trade practices’ that it should investigate and
initiate action against.60
Thirdly, outside the WTO arena, these centers provide assistance to local
enterprises in foreign legal proceedings. This is known as overseas weiquan,
that is, rights protection. For example, with the assistance of the Shenzhen
WTO Affairs Center, Netac Technology Co. sued PNY Technologies, Inc.,
in Texas, alleging that the latter had infringed on its patent rights.61
This case demonstrates a unique but not an isolated example that shows
the flip side of intellectual property infringement cases involving Chinese
companies. In anti-dumping and Section 337 proceedings,62 which
Chinese exporters frequently encounter in the US, the WTO centers also
provide a vertical framework that allows medium-sized companies to share
information and lower litigation expenses by retaining joint counsel. Finally,
these centers operate early warning systems related to potential foreign
anti-dumping measures by monitoring export volumes to export markets
and other data.63 This system is crucial for local companies because 35%
of the world’s anti-dumping measures are directed against China, making the
country the number-one target of such measures.64 These functions per-
formed by the various centers have contributed to China’s WTO legal cap-
acity building and made them a more effective link among major actors in
the trade circle.
C. The operation of government agencies in response to WTO disputes
The think tanks cannot replace the government’s role in the WTO, as par-
ticipation in the WTO rule-making and dispute settlement is legally confined
60 The Ministry of Commerce began issuing the annual Report in 2003. Forward, Foreign
Market Access Report 2003, at 2, available at http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/table/2004report-en
.pdf (visited 20 May 2010).
61 China – Law Firms: A Chinese Company Takes The Initiative In Protecting Its Patents, The
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, December 2009, at 48. See also Netac Reaches Settlement
in US Patent Case, Xinhua, 27 March 2008, available at http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/
business/2008-03/27/content_6570019.htm (visited 20 May 2010) (‘Netac had sought un-
specified financial damages and suspension of PNY’s flash-memory storage devices in a suit
filed in the Eastern District Court, in Texas, in 2006. It was the first case of a Chinese IT
company pursuing patent charges overseas.’)
62 See Charles F. Schill, A Brief Overview of Practice under Section 337, available at http://library
.findlaw.com/2002/Nov/26/132414.html (visited 1 July 2010) (‘Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 . . . provides that unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the US, or in their sale for importation, or sale within the US after importation,
are unlawful.’)
63 See e.g. Gong Baihua, Shanghai’s WTO Affairs Consultation Center: Working Together to Take
Advantage of WTO Membership, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/case-
studies_e/case11_e.htm (visited 2 May 2010) (describing the Center’s early warning system
for anti-dumping disputes).
64 For example, in 2008, China encountered 73 anti-dumping investigations. AD initiations: by
exporting country from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2008, available at http://www.wto
.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init_exp_country_e.pdf (visited 10 May 2010).
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to governments. To adapt to WTO accession, China’s governmental struc-
ture has undergone a significant change. A salient reorganization was the
establishment of the MOFCOM in 2003.65 The MOFCOM merged the
State Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation, which governed domestic and foreign
trade, respectively. The division of work on domestic and foreign markets
was the result of the planned economy, and the separate agencies could not
cope with the market economy mechanism that the WTO mandates.
The government’s legal capacity is essential to its performance in the
WTO. Within the MOFCOM, the two units devoted to WTO tasks
are the Department of WTO Affairs and the Department of Treaty
and Law.66 The Department of WTO Affairs serves concurrently as
China’s WTO Notification and Enquiry Center,67 and it was established
to comply with transparency obligations under WTO rules. This department
is in charge of WTO-related work within the government, responsible pri-
marily for bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and trade policy reviews.
Nonetheless, participation in WTO disputes and negotiations on the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) are within the purview of the Department
of Treaty and Law.68 The WTO Law Division under the department retains
five to eight staff lawyers to deal with WTO disputes involving China.69 In
addition, China’s Permanent Mission to the WTO in Geneva consists of 18
members.70 The competition for entry into the MOFCOM has been rather
intense, given that officials in the ministry are civil servants and enjoy high
levels of job security.71 The competition includes the qualification review,
65 Shangwubu: Zhongguo Jingji Duiwai Lianxi De Qiaoliang [Ministry of Commerce: The Bridge
of China’s Economy to the Outside World], 15 December 2008, available at http://www.china
.com.cn/economic/zhuanti/ggkf30/2008-12/15/content_16949851.htm (in Chinese) (visited 25
May 2010).
66 The fact that both directors of these two departments are well-trained legal professionals
vindicates the government’s goal to enhance its WTO legal capacity.
67 Functions of the Department of WTO Affairs, 22 August 2008, available at http://sms.mofcom.
gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200606/20060602467456.html?3591199086=3878450466 (in Chinese)
(visited 25 May 2010).
68 The Department of Treaty and Law is also responsible for providing advice on amendments
to Chinese laws and rules in compliance with WTO commitments. See Donald C. Clarke,
‘China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance’, 2 Washington University
Global Studies Law Review 97 (2003), 104–11 (detailing China’s compliance with WTO
commitments).
69 Email form a Chinese trade official (name withheld), 25 September 2009 (on file with the
author).
70 Email from a Taiwanese trade official (name withheld), 24 September 2009 (on file with the
author). The number of staff members in China’s WTO Mission is based on the WTO
Bluebook (March 2009 version).
71 Legal positions for the Department of Treaty and Law are even more competitive than other
positions, as they require applicants to have at least a master’s degree and a substantially
higher written examination score than the minimum eligible for interview.
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oral and written examinations in both Chinese and foreign languages.72 It is
noteworthy that MOFCOM legal professionals are not required to be
admitted to the national bar or have prior legal practice experience. Unlike
many trade lawyers in the US Trade Representative (USTR) or the US
Department of Commerce (USDOC), most lawyers in China’s WTO Law
Division never practiced in the private sector.
An analysis of the actual handling of WTO disputes reveals the institu-
tional weakness in practice. Under the country’s ‘active defense’ trade strat-
egy, China enacted the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules (Rules),
which came into force in 2005.73 The function of the Rules is comparable
to that of Section 301 of the US 1974 Trade Act or the EU Trade Barriers
Regulation (TBR) under which domestic companies can request that their
government challenge foreign trade barriers.74 Article 33 of the Rules clearly
mandates that the MOFCOM adopt measures, including initiating WTO
complaints, should foreign barriers persist after investigations are com-
pleted.75 In practice, there has been only one instance in which a Chinese
company petitioned the MOFCOM under the Rules. The case was filed by
the Jiangsu Province Laver Association to challenge Japan’s restriction on
Chinese laver exports.76 Some may applaud the ‘success’ of the Rules be-
cause Japan reopened the market to laver from China in the following year.
However, I would argue that this isolated case in fact exposes the weakness
of the petition system, which makes Chinese companies reluctant to resort to
the Rules, unlike their counterparts in the US and the European Union.
Two explanations underline why private companies have rarely resorted to
the Rules. First, Chinese companies engaged in foreign exports are usually
hesitant to retain lawyers to petition under the Rules for financial reasons.
Most companies located outside the cities that establish WTO centers are
unable to receive their assistance. Although the financial obstacle may be
overcome by trade associations, active associations in China are rare in
72 Shangwubu 2010nian Gongwuyuan Luyong Zhuanye Kaoshi He Mianshi Tongzhi [Ministry of
Commerce Notification regarding Examinations and Interviews for Civil Servants in 2010],
11 February 2010, available at http://rss.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xxfb/201002/2010020678
4906.html?236018030=3878450466 (visited 25 May 2010).
73 Dui Wai Mao Yi Bi Lei Tiao Cha Gui Ze [PRC Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules],
available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/iroftb414/ (visited 25 May 2010).
74 For the operation of US Section 301 and EU TBR rules, see generally Gregory Shaffer,
‘Public-Private Partnerships’ in WTO Dispute Settlement: the US and EU Experience’, in
Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. (eds), The WTO in the Twenty First Century: Dispute Settlement,
Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
75 See Article 33 of the Rules (stating that the MOFCOM may ‘[s]tart settlement mechanism of
multilateral dispute’ or ‘[t]ake other proper measures’).
76 Yan Luo, ‘Engaging the Private Sector: EU-China Trade Disputes under the Shadow of
WTO Law?’, 13 (6) European Law Journal 800 (2007), at 809. This case was filed under
the Provisional Rules on Foreign Trade Barriers Investigations, enforced since November
2002.
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comparison with other countries, such as the US and Brazil.77 Second, some
may contend that the government may initiate the investigations if ‘it deems
necessary’ under Article 4 of the Rules.78 This position ignores China’s
unique political structure and the fact that the Western concept of ‘lobbying’
does not apply in China.79 Local companies usually have no contact with the
central government. Moreover, members of the National People’s Congress
do not necessarily represent voters in their election districts due to the com-
plex multi-layered election system.80 These reasons explain weaknesses about
the practice of the Rules.
Once China files a complaint or receives one from another WTO member,
consultation is a prerequisite before the matter goes to the panel, as required
by the DSU.81 Lawyers at the WTO Law Division under the Department of
Treaty and Law are responsible for the entire litigation process. This alloca-
tion of work is similar to the USTR model and different from the European
Commission model, where legal work for consultation and post-consultation
stages is divided between the Directorate-General (DG) for Trade and the
DG for Legal Service.82 The WTO Law Division also cooperates with other
departments and divisions in pertinent disputes, including, for instance, the
Intellectual Property (IP) Law Division in IP-related cases. In general, for-
eign law firms are rarely retained at the consultation stage, but are frequently
involved in subsequent ones.83 Chinese firms are, nonetheless, hired for both
consultation and subsequent phases for almost every case. Individual lawyers
in the WTO Law Division are paired up with external counsels in disputes.
This cooperation enables government lawyers to absorb DSU expertise from
experienced professionals, thereby enhancing in-house WTO legal capacity.
Substantive litigation work, including legal research and drafting briefs, is
77 Active trade associations include, for instance, the United Steelworkers of the US and
Brazilian Association of Cotton Producers.
78 See Article 4 of the Rules (‘Ministry of Commerce may place the case on file for trade
barriers investigation o[f] its free will as it deems necessary’).
79 Lobbying and government relations are one of the practice areas of certain Washington-based
firms. See e.g. Sheri Qualters, Firms Help U.S. WTO Cases, Law.Com, 13 June 2007, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1181552738538 (visited 28 May
2010) (‘Lobbying followed the information gathering and legal analysis. [A US industry co-
alition,] China Copyright Alliance’s 2006 lobbying fees totaled $280,000 for Greenberg
Taurig and $180,000 for Smith Strong. . .. ’.)
80 China’s ‘real’ elections in the Western sense are limited to villages and factory management.
Kerry Dumbaugh and Michael F. Martin, Understanding China’s Political System,
Congressional Research Service, at 16–17 (31 December 2009).
81 DSU, Article 4.7.
82 Email from an EU trade official (name withheld), 6 January 2009 (on file with the author).
83 Email from a Chinese lawyer of a Brussels-based firm (name withheld), 28 September 2009.
An exception is China – Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits (DS309), where Beijing
Huanzhong and Partners (BHP) was retained to participate in the consultation. Huanzhong
Yeji [Records of BHP], available at http://www.huanzhonglaw.com/hzlaw/hzyj/hzyj.htm (vis-
ited 20 May 2010) (in Chinese). In that case, China subsequently agreed to withdraw the
measures at issue in 2004 (on file with the author).
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primarily done by the MOFCOM and law firms in Beijing. Similar to most
other countries, China’s Geneva-based WTO Mission does not play a sig-
nificant role in the actual litigation process because of its lack of legal
professionals.84
D. Participation of external counsel in WTO cases
As noted earlier, China’s WTO legal capacity is at the early stage of devel-
opment. Compared with other states that have lawyers with WTO litigation
expertise, the size of the legal teams within the Chinese government is about
one-third the size of their counterparts in the US, the European Union or
Canada.85 The small number of specialized WTO lawyers, along with of the
fact that they have much less WTO litigation experience, invariably leads to
China’s shortage of ‘institutional memory’. This shortage hinders the law-
yers’ ability to deal with unwritten procedures established by customs.86
Furthermore, legal professionals in the WTO Law Division of the
Department of Treaty and Law become civil servants after they pass the
public official examination. The ‘value’ of their prior legal experience, if
any, is not reflected in their salaries or official rankings. In the US, the
‘revolving door’ is common between the government and private firms,
which allows the agency to benefit from private experience at a low cost.87
Nevertheless, a more common scenario in China is the ‘one-way door’:
senior government lawyers often move to law firms, but not vice versa.88
In fact, there is no mechanism for senior private lawyers to join the govern-
ment without taking the official examination with recent law school gradu-
ates. In this regard, Korea employs a more flexible mechanism that allows its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to directly recruit foreign lawyers,
84 Currently, Wenhua Ji (Second Secretary; PhD in Law, Peking University) is the primary official
devoted to Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) matters with the Chinese Mission.
85 As mentioned in Section III.C., the WTO Law Division within China’s MOFCOM has five to
eight staff lawyers. In comparison, the USTR, EU DG-Legal Services and DG-Trade, and
Canada’s Ministry of International Trade retain approximately 25–30 trade lawyers.
Memorandum on Handling WTO Disputes by WTO Members (on file with the author)
(in Chinese).
86 These unwritten customs, not governed by any WTO rules, are of importance to developing
countries in WTO litigation. These customs include, for instance, the format of the brief, the
method of submitting the brief to the WTO Secretariat, a motion to postpone the oral
hearing, the style of oral arguments, or even the selection of foreign or domestic law firms.
87 This is particularly true in the USTR or US Department of Commerce, where many officials
were previously senior attorneys or partners at Washington, DC-based law firms.
88 For example, Jun Wei and Roy Zou of Hogan Lovells (formerly Hogan and Hartson) were
previously with the Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People’s Congress and the
Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively. International
Trade, available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/pressroom/detail.aspx?news=1573 (visited 15
May 2010). Zhang Yuejiao, current WTO Appellate Body Member, was previously with the
Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
before she joined Jun He Law Offices. Appellate Body Members, available at http://www.wto
.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_bio_e.htm#zhang (visited 15 May 2010).
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usually US-qualified lawyers of Korean descent, to handle WTO litigation.89
China should allow similar flexibility in its official recruitment in order to
attract experienced lawyers, both foreign and Chinese, to enhance its
in-house WTO legal capacity.
1. The WTO Secretariat and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law
Considering the lack of in-house legal capacity, it is essential for China to
gain additional assistance from external sources, as many developing coun-
tries do. The WTO Secretariat regularly provides technical assistance to de-
veloping country members. The Secretariat’s technical assistance is,
nonetheless, remotely useful in WTO litigation because it provides mostly
training courses, instead of legal advice in actual disputes.90 Some may refer
to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), an international organiza-
tion that was established to assist developing countries in WTO law.91 I do
not challenge the ACWL’s contribution to ensure fair participation by those
countries in WTO disputes.92 It is, however, noteworthy that emerging
economies, including China, Korea and Brazil, have showed no intention
to join the ACWL.93
Why does China have little interest in the ACWL’s ‘relatively affordable’
legal services? First, the ACWL is not mandated to assist countries in
fact-gathering, which is crucial to China’s WTO cases because most
89 Memorandum on Handling WTO Disputes by WTO Members, above n 85. The Ministry
has gradually increased contract-based WTO law experts who went to domestic or foreign law
schools. Unlike most Korean government officials, these experts do not need to take the
official examination. Although the number of these experts is still limited, this flexible re-
cruitment mechanism enables Korean professionals trained overseas to practice WTO law in
the Korean government, thus increasing its legal capacity with limited cost. Discussions with a
member of the WTO Secretariat (name withheld), 2006–2007; one anonymous reviewer also
provided insight into this issue.
90 The WTO runs Geneva-based training courses and Regional Trade Policy Courses (RTPCs).
The RTPCs for the Asia and Pacific region were jointly held by the WTO and the University
of Hong Kong (2004–2006) and the National University of Singapore (2007–Present).
Biennial Technical Assistance and Training Plan 2010–11, Committee on Trade and
Development, WT/COMTD/W170/Rev.1, 21 October 2009, at 12–13 and 20. See also,
Mitsuo Matsushita [former Appellate Body Member], ‘The Sutherland Report and its
Discussion of Dispute Settlement Reforms’, 8 (3) Journal of International Economic Law
623 (2005), at 628 (stating that based on his own experience, ‘just occasionally giving sem-
inars on WTO matters for officials of developing country Members seem to be insufficient.’);
Andrew D. Mitchell, ‘A Legal Principle of Special and Differential Treatment for WTO
Disputes’, 5 (3) World Trade Review 445 (2006), at 453 (‘[D]eveloped countries may be
prepared to provide [technical] assistance only on an ad hoc basis . . . and may tend to con-
struct technical assistance to pursue their own interests. . ..’.)
91 The ACWL was established in 2001 and operates independently of the WTO Secretariat.
ACWL, available at http://www.acwl.ch/e/index.html (visited 20 May 2010).
92 See e.g. Report on Operations 2009, ACWL, at 8–9 (describing the ACWL’s dispute settle-
ment support for its members).
93 Ibid., at 21 (‘[S]ix of the most experienced countries (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Korea, Chile
and China) have not considered it necessary to join the ACWL.’). It should be noted that
although Brazil, Korea and China are emerging economies, they possess relatively extensive
WTO litigation experience.
1020 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(4)
 at Singapore M
anagem
ent University on Decem
ber 21, 2010
jiel.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
controversial issues do not arise from statutes, but from their enforcement.
Secondly, the ACWL possesses neither translation services nor Chinese pro-
fessionals. This deficiency makes it difficult for ACWL lawyers to understand
the operation of Chinese law. Thirdly, ACWL professionals lack economic
expertise. They are unable to help a country assess whether it is economic-
ally viable to bring complaints. Even if a country prevails, the ACWL cannot
advise how to retaliate against the industries of the losing party. This is
particularly important to developing countries’ use of cross-retaliation
against developed ones, as efficient retaliation invariably depends on an eco-
nomic analysis. Finally, the preferential rate that the ACWL charges provides
a limited incentive for China.94 The huge costs of WTO litigation per se
constitute no deterrent for China to go to the WTO court.95 Many other
developing countries cannot fund the litigation expenses without the involve-
ment of trade associations.96 China is different. Its government agencies are
de facto owners of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and all WTO litigation
expenses are covered within the government budget. Therefore, the Chinese
mentality concerning retaining external counsel is to prefer fully committed
lawyers in leading law firms rather than seek the ACWL’s assistance, despite
the fact that it charges less.
2. International trade law firms
China is well aware that in order to litigate before WTO courts, it is essential
to seek the assistance of experienced international lawyers. A common mis-
understanding is that China did not retain foreign law firms until its involve-
ment in WTO disputes. In fact, China first hired a foreign firm in the early
1980 s when it was involved in Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, com-
monly known as the Huguang Railway Bond case.97 This case concerned
94 For ACWL members, the hourly rates for WTO proceedings are divided by four categories,
including Categories A to C and least developed countries, and range from US $25 to US
$200. Annex IV: Schedule of Fees for Services Rendered by the Centre, available at http://www
.acwl.ch/e/documents/annex_4_e.pdf (visited 20 May 2010). By comparison, leading New
York and Washington DC-based firms charge approximately US $300–400 per hour for
work performed by junior lawyers and US $200 by paralegals (non-lawyers).
95 See Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, ICTSD Resources Paper No. 5 (2003),
at 16 (‘Lawyers for Kodak and Fuji in the Japan-Photographic Film case respectively charged
their clients fees in excess of $10 million dollars.’). In that case, Fuji, instead of the Japanese
government, covered most litigation expenses. See also, Wang, above n 49 (‘Given Beijing’s
vast resources, cost is a negligible issue, even though the billable hours can rack up and trade
disputes drag on for years.’).
96 For instance, legal work for Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil
(DS241) and EC – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken (DS269), and the EC –
Bananas III Arbitration (DS27) were funded, respectively, by the Brazilian Poultry Association
and Del Monte, the largest Brazilian banana exporter. Gregory Shaffer et al., ‘The Trials of
Winning at the WTO: What Lies behind Brazil’s Success’, 41 Cornell International Law
Journal 382 (2008), at 461–62.
97 Jackson v People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986).
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whether the PRC could assert sovereign immunity regarding unpaid princi-
pal and interest that arose from bonds issued by the Ching Dynasty to
finance railroad construction.98 China initially declined to appear before
the US court, but then decided to safeguards its interests with ‘foreign as-
sistance’. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained a prominent US firm,
Baker & McKenzie, which persuaded the court to set aside the unfavorable
default judgment.99 The shift in China’s official attitude toward foreign liti-
gation and law firms echoes my previous analysis regarding China’s evolving
view on international law and sovereignty in the post-economic reform era.
WTO cases are often more complex than domestic ones. Foreign law firms
with WTO expertise are thus essential to China and other developing coun-
tries. Since the 1997 EC-Bananas case in which the Appellate Body found
that a WTO member possesses the right to decide the ‘composition of its
delegation’,100 it is increasingly common to see developing countries repre-
sented by Western law firms.101 Throughout the 15 years of DSU practice,
certain elite law firms have formed a ‘WTO bar’ with a de facto monopoly on
WTO cases.102 A renowned example is Sidley Austin, which has represented
Brazil in multiple high-profile disputes.103
One crucial issue concerning employment of foreign law firms to represent
developing countries is to select suitable ones, given that the quality of
services and attorney fees vary. While many Washington, D.C., and
Brussels-based law firms claim to have international trade practices, they
are limited to handling domestic anti-dumping cases. For countries that
lack WTO experience, it is often onerous to identify law firms that are cap-
able of handling WTO cases. Unlike domestic judgments, WTO decisions do
98 Note that the case occurred before the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act,
which contains the ‘commercial exception’ to sovereign immunity claims. See Monroe Leigh,
‘Jackson v. People’s Republic of China 794 F.2d 1490.’, 81 American Journal of International
Law 1 (1987), at 214–16 (discussing the decisions of the District Court, Court of Appeals
and the involvement of the Department of State).
99 William Scarbrough, ‘Practicing Law in China’, 6:1 Practice Innovation: Managing in a
Changing Legal Environment (2005), at 9.
100 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591,
para 10.
101 See Yasuhei Taniguchi [former Appellate Body member], ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement as
Seen by a Proceduralist’, 42 Cornell International Law Journal 1 (2009), 16 (‘[I]t is
common to see a lawyer from a big American law firm arguing a case before the panel
and Appellate Body on behalf of a non-American government.’).
102 For information on the involvement of US firms (e.g. King and Spalding, Willkie Farr and
Gallagher and Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr) in DSU cases, see Chad P. Brown
and Bernard M. Hoekman, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country
Cases: Engaging The Private Sector’, 8 (4) Journal of International Economic Law 861
(2005), at 872.
103 For instance, the firm represented Brazil in US – Upland Cotton (DS267) and Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres (DS332). Our Practice: WTO Disputes, available at http://www.sidley
.com/OurPractice/ServiceDetail.aspx?Service=689 (visited 15 May 2010).
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not bear the names of representative law firms and lawyers. Due to ‘national
dignity’, some developing countries also intentionally hide such information
because most, if not all, external counsels are Americans or Europeans.104
Chinese companies are hesitant to accept the ‘foreign’ practice of hourly
charges. To attract their business, it is not uncommon for foreign law firms
to cap the attorney fees on a case basis.105 Like those companies, the
Chinese government also tends to limit the litigation budget. Thus, for
WTO litigation, the MOFCOM’s Department of Treaty and Law requests
that certain international and domestic law firms bid for the right to repre-
sent. For foreign trade-remedy cases, the relevant chamber of commerce or
the trade association sets up a ‘beauty contest’, in which invited firms are
given 5–20 minutes to demonstrate their expertise and experience.106
Potential respondents, usually SOEs, in those cases, may contact the firms
that meet their expectations. This bidding process enables the affected SOEs
to retain a firm ‘at a very low rate’.107 On the one hand, some firms have
shied away from representing China because the low charge significantly
compresses profit margins. For instance, despite its Washington, D.C.-
based lawyers’ DSU expertise, White & Case’s Beijing office primarily
focuses its trade practice on providing more profitable WTO-related consult-
ing services to enterprises. On the other hand, some firms view an oppor-
tunity to work with the Chinese government or SOEs as a gateway to their
China practice. This can be demonstrated by the fact that US firms retained
by the Chinese government in WTO cases, including Winston & Strawn,
Hogan Lovells (formerly Hogan & Hartson) and Steptoe & Johnson, all
maintain branch offices in Beijing.108
104 Korea and Japan had disallowed foreign lawyers from appearing in oral hearings. This prac-
tice varies. For example, Korea was the first country to retain foreign private counsels for
GATT disputes (e.g. Korea – Beef I case, in which the Korean government permitted a
European lawyer to attend the oral hearing) and was one of the first countries to argue
for the right to use foreign lawyers in the WTO proceedings (e.g. Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages case). Dukgeun Ahn, ‘Korea in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: Legal
Battle for Economic Development’, 6 (3) Journal of International Economic Law 597
(2003), at 603–4, fn 43 and 611–3.
105 This is particularly common in anti-dumping cases involving Chinese exporters.
106 Email from a partner of a Washington, DC-based law firm (name withheld), 28 September
2009; comments from an anonymous reviewer.
107 Ibid. Because a small number of law firms stand out as elite firms, the ‘beauty contest’
bidding process has been gradually replaced by direct contact by the law firms and potential
respondents.
108 The Chinese government retained foreign law firms in the following cases in which China
was either the complainant or respondent: Winston & Strawn in US – Measures Affecting
Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China (DS399); US –
Preliminary Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on Coated Free Sheet Paper
from China (DS368); Hogan and Hartson, which merged with Lovells in May 2010, in China
– Intellectual Property Rights (DS362); Steptoe & Johnson in China – Auto Parts (DS339).
Hana R. ALberts, Paper: The Next Trade Skirmish, Forbes, 24 September 2009, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/24/china-indonesia-paper-dumping-business-washington-
trade.html (visited 28 May 2010).
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3. China’s WTO bar
To develop WTO legal capacity within its private sector, the Chinese gov-
ernment requires foreign law firms to work with Beijing-based local firms. It
is thus common to see multiple law firms represent China in a given case.
For example, both Hogan Lovells and King & Wood collaborated on China –
Intellectual Property Rights,109 and Steptoe & Johnson and Hylands Law Firm
on China – Auto Parts.110 In these cases, Chinese firms—King & Wood and
Hylands—were cost-effective for their fact-gathering, the Chinese law ana-
lysis and translations.111 For third-party cases that involve less risk to
Chinese enterprises’ substantive interests, the government usually retains
local firms, also through a bidding process. It is the government’s goal
that through working with foreign law firms and on third-party cases, local
firms will accumulate WTO litigation experience and may one day represent
China without foreign assistance.
Although the result of strengthening public–private cooperation remains to
be seen, the Chinese version of the ‘WTO bar’ is becoming increasingly
visible. This bar consists of prominent Beijing law firms, such as King &
Wood, Beijing Huanzhong & Partners (BHP) and Jincheng Tonda &
Neal.112 They have developed DSU expertise through handling various
109 China – Intellectual Property Rights (DS362). King & Wood was retained in DS212, 257, 273,
296, 301, 316, 317, 362 and 379. Xuanfeng (Susan) Ning, King & Wood PRC Lawyers,
Trade Lawyers Blog, available at http://tradelawyersblog.com/contributors/susan-ning/
(visited 10 May 10 2010); King & Wood Assists MOFCOM in Winning a Landmark IPR
Protection Dispute, available at http://www.kingandwood.com/ProjectsCases.aspx?id=King–
Wood-Assists-MOFCOM-in-Winning-a-Landmark-IPR-Protection-Dispute&language=en
(visited 10 May 2010).
110 China – Auto Parts (DS339). US lawyers from Steptoe & Johnson also appeared and argued
before the panel and Appellate Body. The firm also hired a Chinese lawyer (Ying Huang) to
work on this case in the Washington, DC office. See also, Services, Hylands Law Firm,
available at http://www.hylandslaw.com/english/services/work_range_6.asp?sType=6 (visited
10 May 2010) (describing the firm’s WTO practice).
111 It is also increasingly important for US trade law firms to retain Chinese staff. See Zach Lowe,
Winston, King & Spalding in Middle of China Trade Wars, 25 September 2009, The American
Law Daily, available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/09/winston-king-
spaulding.html (visited 1 June 2010) (‘King & Spalding has made a point of hiring lawyers
and staff in Washington, DC who can speak Chinese, and the firm has well-sourced
connections in China that it hires to dig up evidence of government subsidies. . .’).
112 The WTO law practices of Chinese firms are rapidly developing, yet still at the early stage in
comparison with their US or EU counterparts. BHP and King & Wood are Chinese law
firms’ pioneers in the WTO practice. BHP has been involved in numerous WTO disputes,
including China’s first WTO case as one of the complainants, US-Steel Safeguards (DS251)
and DS276, 294, 302 and 309. King & Wood ‘started its WTO practice soon after China
joined the WTO in 2001’ and ‘is the Chinese firm that most consistently works with foreign
lawyers to represent China in WTO disputes’. Tina Wang, China’s Coming of Age in the WTO
War, Forbes, 20 April 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/20/china-wto-trade-
markets-economy-law.html (visited 1 June 2010). The WTO cases in which the firm was
involved are listed in fn. 107. Other Chinese law firms that have represented the government
in WTO disputes include, for instance, Jincheng Tongda & Neal (D295, 312, 323, 334, and
363), Grandall Legal Group (DS108, 267, and 308), Broad & Bright (DS264 and 358),
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cases and cultivated China’s WTO lawyers. These lawyers are former gov-
ernment officials or law school graduates with foreign education and experi-
ence.113 Among them, the most prominent example may be the first Chinese
Appellate Body Member, Zhang Yueziao, previously a senior counsel with
Jun He Law Offices in Beijing.114 In my view, China’s ‘learning by doing’
strategy to enhance its WTO legal capacity by involving local lawyers in
WTO cases can bridge the ‘one-way door’ weakness in the Chinese govern-
ment system and allow local lawyers to gain WTO expertise with minimum
‘tuition’. This strategy may serve as a model for other developing countries.
IV. THE CHINESE WAY APPLIED IN THE WTO PRACTICE: 2001–2010
As discussed previously, China’s awareness of the importance of internation-
al economic law began with its enterprises’ pragmatic needs when interacting
with the outside world during the economic reform. Since China’s accession
to the WTO, the world trading system has prompted the government to
assume a more active role to safeguard its companies. Due to the overlapping
interest of public and private sectors, the past decade witnessed the evolution
of China’s participation in WTO affairs. While the phrase ‘aggressive legal-
ism’ has been suggested to describe some East Asian states’ approach to the
WTO,115 a more accurate term for China is ‘assertive legalism’. China’s
strategy in the WTO’s rule-making and dispute settlement is not yet aggres-
sive,116 as it primarily aims to protect its legitimate trade interests by increas-
ingly resorting to WTO rules. Its assertive legalism drew global attention
because it is distinguishable from the country’s passive attitude toward inter-
national rules and the WTO in the early days.
A. China and WTO rule-making
Following China’s initial exposure to modern international law, it found the
Western legal order biased because China was barred from participating in
rule-making. Interestingly, even after the PRC entered the UN and its
Hylands Law Firm (two cases with multiple complainants: DS339, 340, 342 and; DS372,
373, 378), Scott Liu & Associates (DS212; and one case with multiple complainants:
DS339, 340, 342) and Seafront Law Office (DS251 and 309). Information above is gathered
from the websites of the respective law firms.
113 Prominent trade lawyers in China include, for example, Stephen Peng of Jincheng Tongda &
Neal, Susan Ning of King & Wood, Wang Xuehua of BHP, and Scott Liu of Scott Liu &
Associates. These law firms and lawyers with WTO litigation experience constitute what I
call China’s ‘WTO bar’.
114 Jun He is also a leading Chinese firm, but its website does not list specific WTO cases in
which it was involved.
115 For example, see generally Saadia M. Pekkanen, Japan’s Aggressive Legalism: Law and Foreign
Trade Politics Beyond the WTO (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
116 According to Table 1, as of 1 July 2010, while India, Japan and Korea have filed 19, 13 and
14 complaints, respectively, China has filed only 7 complaints.
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affiliated agencies, its role was mostly to follow the rules rather than to
change such rules, except regarding issues concerning its legitimacy or sov-
ereignty. The Chinese ‘UN mentality’ predominated during its initial par-
ticipation in the WTO, but this mentality has changed. In fact, it had to
change because with the increased knowledge about the WTO, it has become
a common desire among those in China’s trade circle to become more
actively involved in WTO rule-making.
In China’s view, an ‘efficient’ way to get involved is to have rule-makers of
Chinese nationality. This approach has been applied in other international
courts and tribunals.117 While the DSU mandates that panelists and
Appellate Body members be impartial in WTO litigation, these WTO
judges’ first-hand experience can benefit their respective countries’ legal cap-
acity. A panelist in the present case may serve as a government counsel in the
next case. Furthermore, although it has official status in the UN, Chinese is
not one of the three official languages at the WTO, and the Chinese gov-
ernment and academia must gain an understanding of WTO law by using
translations. Having Chinese WTO judges share their experience could fill
the information void for the country. Recognizing the importance of
rule-making, in 2004, 2006 and 2010, respectively, China nominated a
total of 11 WTO experts to be panelists, although so far only Zhang
Yuqing was selected to be a panelist in EC – Bananas.118 Moreover, in
2008, the first Chinese lawyer was nominated to the seven-person
Appellate Body after a brief episode of Taiwan blocking her nomination.119
It is likely that more Chinese will sit on the WTO bench and bring their
experience to the government, particularly given that most WTO experts
whom China nominated are either incumbent or former Ministry of
Commerce officials.
Another circle that China is attempting to break into is the WTO
Secretariat. Undoubtedly, WTO judges play a significant role in WTO judi-
cial functions. Nevertheless, under the current system, both panelists and
Appellate Body members are ‘part-time’ and most of them are not based in
117 For the list of Chinese judges in international courts and tribunals, see above n 14.
118 For personal information on the 11 Chinese WTO experts, see Prof. Han Liyu Appointed
into Indicative List of WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, Remin University of China Law
School, available at http://www.law.ruc.edu.cn/eng/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=22229 (visited
30 May 2010). Zhang Yuqing served as a panelist in EC – Bananas, Article 21.5 II
(Ecuador), WT/DS27/RW2/ECU and EC – Bananas, Article 21.5 (US), WT/DS27/RW/
USA.
119 At the DSB meeting, Taiwan blocked the nomination of Appellate Body members, stating that
its government has ‘deep concerns on the question of impartiality and qualification of one of the
recommended candidates’. Taiwan blocks Chinese WTO judge, BBC News, 19 November 2007,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7102347.stm (visited 2 June 2010). For in-
formation on recent developments in China–Taiwan relations, see Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘The Taiwan
Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with Renewed Momentum’, 84 (3) Die
Friedens-Warte: Journal of International Peace and Organization 59 (2009), at 73–9.
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Geneva. The individuals who are exposed to the inside information related
to the WTO are staff of the WTO Secretariat. In particular, legal officers
from the Rules Division, the Legal Affairs Division (LAD), and the
Appellate Body Secretariat (ABS) consistently assist panelists and
Appellate Body members in cases. They gain insight into the process of
judicial decision-making. Shockingly, despite China’s status in the world
economy, only five out of the 629 WTO officials are PRC nationals, includ-
ing one serving in the LAD and the other in the ABS.120 This is an ex-
tremely low percentage of WTO staff, especially in comparison with 181
French and 72 British nationals in the Secretariat.121 The shortage of
Chinese staff members in the Secretariat may be due to the French or
Spanish language requirement. This creates a disadvantage for Chinese pro-
fessionals because neither French nor Spanish is a common second language
in China’s education system.122 To rectify this situation, China, along with
other developing countries, recently submitted a formal proposal that called
for increasing ‘diversification of the WTO Secretariat’.123 Although the result
of the proposal remains to be seen, it indicates a start of Chinese engage-
ment in the institutional change of international organizations.
With respect to the substance of WTO rules, China focuses primarily on
those rules it deems unfavorable to itself, so it is inclined to join the nego-
tiating coalitions made up of other developing countries. For instance, as
Chinese enterprises are the prime target of anti-dumping measures, China
has called for reforming the special and differential (S&D) treatment provi-
sions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement.124 In particular, China strongly ad-
vocates the abolition of the non-market economy status provisions in the
agreement because foreign authorities tend to resort to such provisions to
inflate the margin of dumping, thereby finding Chinese companies liable for
dumping.125 Regarding procedural rules in WTO proceedings, China also
120 Overview of the WTO Secretariat, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/
intro_e.htm (visited 30 May 2010). As of May 2010, the WTO Secretariat has six
Chinese staff members, including five from Mainland China and one from Hong Kong.
121 Ibid. Note that the WTO divides staff into two categories: supporting staff (e.g. translators
and guards) and professional staff (e.g. legal and economic officers). Many French staff
belongs to the former category.
122 The justification for requiring legal officials to speak French or Spanish can hardly stand
because almost every WTO case proceeds in English. To cope with the growing number of
cases involving China and other Asian nations and their demand for technical assistance, the
WTO Secretariat should consider revising its recruitment practice.
123 Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration – Joint Proposals on the Improvement of
Diversification of the WTO Secretariat, WT/BFA/W/191, 4 November 2009, by Brazil,
China, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Pakistan and South Africa.
124 See generally, Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from the People’s Republic of
China, Proposal of the People’s Republic of China on the Negotiation on Anti-Dumping,
TN/RL/W/66, 6 March 2003.
125 Ibid. For the analysis of China’s position on anti-dumping rules, see Won-Mog Choi,
‘People’s Republic of China’s Proposal for Anti-Dumping in WTO/DDA Rules’, 2 Asian
Journal WTO and International Health Law and Policy 25 (2007).
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asked for S&D treatment in DSU negotiations, requiring developed coun-
tries to ‘exercise due restraint’ in cases against developing countries.126
This proposal can be understood in the backdrop of the dramatic increase
in WTO litigation brought against China by the US and the European
Union. In addition, China has proposed enhanced third-party rights,
which, for instance, allow third parties to attend ‘all substantive meetings
of the panel’, instead of only the first meeting according to the current DSU
rules.127 Third-party rights are of importance to China, as it is a
cost-effective way for China’s participation in WTO litigation.
B. China in WTO dispute settlement
Over the past decade, China has consistently made WTO legal capacity
building a priority and endeavored to fortify public–private partnerships to
enhance this capacity. Hence, it is important to examine the Chinese ap-
proach in handling WTO disputes and rule-making and assess the impact of
its WTO legal capacity-building efforts in that process.
1. China as a third party
As with many other developing countries, China consistently participates in
WTO cases as a third party. Since China’s first third-party experience in
US – Textiles Rules of Origin in 2003,128 only 2 years after its accession to
the WTO, the country has been involved in 67 cases as a third party.129 As
Table 1 shows, this figure surpasses that of many developing countries, such
as Brazil, India and Korea, that joined the WTO much earlier. There are
compelling reasons for China’s third-party strategy. First, being a third party
allows the government to gain a better understanding of the operation of
Table 1. Asian and other emerging economies’ participation in WTO cases (as of 1 July 2010)
WTO Member since Complainant Respondent Third party
Brazil, 1995 24 14 59
China, 2001 7 18 67
India, 1995 19 20 55
Japan, 1995 13 15 99
Korea, 1995 14 14 52
Taiwan, 2002 3 0 53
Vietnam, 2007 1 0 3
Statistics based on the WTO website.
126 Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Drafting Inputs from
China, TN/DS/W/51/Rev.1, 13 March 2003.
127 Ibid. China’s DSU proposals also include TN/DS/W/29, 23 January 2003; TN/DS/W/51,
5 March 2003; and TN/DS/W/57, 19 May 2003.
128 DS243, US – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds243_e.htm (visited 15 May 2010).
129 China and the WTO, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e
.htm (visited 15 May 2010).
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trade law among China’s trading partners and to obtain access to the liti-
gants’ submissions, which may not always be publicly available. Such infor-
mation benefits China when it is a complainant. Secondly, being a third
party is a cost-effective way to enhance China’s WTO legal capacity. Even
at the appellate stage, a third participant is not required by the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review to submit briefs, thus requiring much less
preparation and litigation expenses.130 For example, China made only oral
statements at the hearings instead of submitting written statements in all
of the 2008 and 2009 appellate cases in which it was a third participant.131
If a third party wishes to make submissions, it can address only the two to
three key issues that it deems to be systemically important. As being a third
party provides a good training opportunity, the MOFCOM consistently re-
tains Chinese law firms to handle these cases.132 Finally, participation in
cases as a third party allows China to express its views on the interpretation
of important WTO rules, thus facilitating its involvement in the rule-making
process. The benefit of being a third party is exemplified in US – Upland
Cotton in which the parties involved sought a favorable interpretation of
WTO subsidies rules when they faced an impasse in negotiating such
rules.133
2. China as a respondent
The accumulation of third-party experience certainly benefits China’s legal
capacity. This is particularly important to China because it has been a prime
target of WTO litigation by other WTO members due to its rapidly increas-
ing volume of exports as a result of its perceived unfair trade practice. This
trend is primarily prompted by the fact that most of China’s WTO commit-
ments were phased in by the end of 2006. Thus, China’s trading partners,
especially the US, intend to hold China ‘fully accountable as a mature
member’ in the WTO.134 More importantly, the escalation of pressure
130 A third party at the appellate stage is known as a third participant. Definitions, Working
Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/5, 4 January 2005 (Working Procedures).
131 In these cases, China appeared before the Appellate Body as a third participant according to
Rule 24(2) of the Working Procedures, under which ‘a Member that was a third party to the
panel proceedings that has not filed a written submission may, within 25 days of the filing of
the Notice of Appeal, notify its intention to appear at the oral hearing and whether it intends
to make a statement at the hearing’. Appellate Body Annual Report for 2009, WT/AB/13, 17
February 2010, at 40–1; Appellate Body Annual Report for 2008, WT/AB/11, 9 February
2009, at 37–9. As the standard practice, oral statements are made at the beginning and the
end of the hearing.
132 For WTO cases in which Chinese law firms were involved, see above n 112. China was a
third party is most of the cases.
133 See generally, Appellate Body Report, US – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R,
adopted 21 March 2005, DSR 2005:I, 3; Appellate Body Report, US – Subsidies on Upland
Cotton – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted 20
June 2008.
134 See 2009 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, United States Trade
Representative, December 2009, at 2 (‘All of China’s key commitments should have been
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from domestic industries compelled these governments to take trade actions
against China. In simple words, their WTO honeymoon with China was
over.
Since the US filed the very first WTO case against China in 2004, the
country so far has faced 18 complaints135 and 61% of them were filed by
joint complainants.136 Given their significant trade interests, it is not surpris-
ing to see the predominant presence of the US and the European Union in
these cases. Yet, the joint-complainant cases have resulted in the ‘bandwagon
effect’ that prompted other developing countries, such as Mexico and
Guatemala, to join the US or the European Union against China.137 An
attractive incentive for joining the alliance is that it is common for joint
complainants to share information and strategies, thus decreasing litigation
costs.138 Moreover, 50% of the complaints against China were settled with
complainants at the consultation stage.139 In all of these cases and those in
which the WTO courts found against China, China agreed to withdraw its
WTO-inconsistent measures in less than a year.
The statistics above suggests China’s ‘soft’ approach to WTO disputes and
reaffirms its traditional preference to solve international disputes by diplo-
macy rather than litigation. However, the country’s attitude and strategy
toward WTO litigation is gradually changing. In 2006, China suffered the
first WTO defeat in China – Auto Parts, in which both the panel and
Appellate Body found China’s tariff imposed on imported parts illegal
under WTO rules.140 Remarkably, from the perspective of legal capacity
building, China, for the first time, appealed the case to the Appellate
Body. China’s changing attitude resulted in a limited success in China –
Intellectual Property Rights in 2007.141 In this case, although the US
phased in by December 11, 2006, two years ago. [Thus,] the United States has been working
to hold China fully accountable as a mature member of the international trading
system . . . .’).
135 China – Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, DS309.
136 11 of 18 complaints were filed by multiple complainants. For additional information, refer to
Table A1(lower panel).
137 For example, in China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
co-complainants were the US (DS394), the EU (DS395) and Mexico (DS398); and in
China – Grants, Loans, and Other Incentives, co-complainants were the US (DS387),
Mexico (DS388) and Guatemala (DS390). The ACWL assisted Guatemala in this matter.
Report on Operations 2009, ACWL, at 11.
138 For instance, Canada, the US and the EU in China – Auto Parts submitted almost identical
factual statements in their respective submissions, hence reducing workloads for individual
countries.
139 Nine of 18 complaints were settled at the consultation stage. For additional information,
refer to Table A1 (lower panel).
140 Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/
AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2009, para 253.
141 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009.
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succeeded in most claims, the panel disagreed with its challenge to China’s
high threshold for criminal prosecution of copyright infringement.142 Given
China’s defense, the US failed to prevail over this presumably most vital
issue from the industry perspective. The mixed ruling in this case taught
China a lesson: active defense can be useful. It should be noted that in both
cases, China’s active defensive strategy may have been due to advice
rendered by experienced US law firms.
Despite China’s change in attitude toward defensive cases, there remains a
deficiency in its litigation skills. China – Publications and Audiovisual
Products143 serves as a conspicuous example. This case was brought by the
US in 2007 against China’s measures to restrict trading rights and distribu-
tion services for foreign publications and audiovisual home entertainment
products.144 It is difficult to understand how China failed to provide
English translations of key provisions of its own laws, which were at the
core of the case.145 This oversight, which led to the panel and Appellate
Body’s acceptance of US translations of Chinese statutes, contributed to the
panel’s decision against China. The inadequacy of litigation skills in certain
cases does not overshadow the fact that China’s defensive strategy is rapidly
maturing. This strategy will continue not only because of the nation’s trade
interests, but because WTO cases against China are no longer limited to
trade rules. China increasingly faces legal challenges in politically sensitive
areas, such as the country’s censorship policy146 and economic sovereignty
over the export of raw materials.147 These cases often incur ultra-nationalist
142 See James Mendenhall, ‘WTO Panel Report on Consistency of Chinese Intellectual Property
Standards’, 13 (4) ASIL Insight (2009), available at http://www.asil.org/insights090403.cfm
(visited) (‘Significantly, the panel did not find that China’s criminal enforcement scheme was
consistent with TRIPS Article 61, but only that [the] United States had failed to prove its
claims’). This panel decision was not appealed.
143 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19
January 2010.
144 Ibid, paras 1–2.
145 China did not provide English translations for Articles 3 and 4 of the Foreign Investment
Regulation and Article 4 of Several Opinions. Provisions of the Chinese Measures Relevant
to This Appeal. Ibid, at 178–9.
146 For example, in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, one major issue was
whether China could justify its restrictions on entities permitted to import publication and
audiovisual products under Article XX of the GATT because such restrictions are ‘necessary
to protect public morals’ in order for the government to efficiently carry out its content
review policy. Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1,
adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS363/AB/R, paras
7.794–7.807.
147 In China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, the US, EC and
Mexico challenged ‘China’s restraints on the exportation from China of various forms of
bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow
phosphorus, and zinc’. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States,
WT/DS394/7, 9 November 2009.
China and WTO Legal Capacity Building 1031
 at Singapore M
anagem
ent University on Decem
ber 21, 2010
jiel.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
reactions from the public, thus further compelling the government to vigor-
ously defend itself at the WTO.
3. China as a complainant
China’s shift to an offensive position in WTO courts signifies its new think-
ing toward the international legal system. The tactic is to ‘fight the war to
end all wars’. Mainstream thinking among members of China’s trade circle is
that to deter a potential trade war with the US, the European Union and
developing countries that have jumped on the bandwagon, China must act
preemptively.148 As of June 2010, China has initiated seven complaints, all of
which were against the US and the European Union. China has resorted to
the WTO every year since 2007 and filed three consecutive complaints in
2009 alone. Most of these cases challenge the non-market economy treat-
ment of anti-dumping and safeguard proceedings that China deems unfair.
China’s assertive tactics are not confined only to the WTO arena. Frictions
under the WTO often originate from US or EU domestic trade proceedings.
China is attempting to bar these disputes at their origins. This tactic can be
seen in a series of domestic cases in 2009. The US and the European Union,
respectively, announced their punitive tariffs or trade-remedy investigations
against Chinese goods, including car tires, steel pipes and chicken prod-
ucts.149 China immediately responded to every case by initiating anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy investigations on US and EU manufacturers
that export the same products to China.150 Although Beijing declined to
recognize its response as retaliation, it was clear that its goal is to magnify
foreign industry costs, thereby creating a chilling effect for foreign govern-
ments that contemplate actions against China.
China’s recent litigation experience also reveals significant progress from
the public–private cooperation perspective. For instance, in 2006, the
MOFCOM issued the Provisions on Responding to Antidumping Cases concern-
ing Export Products, which require Chinese enterprises to ‘actively respond’
to foreign anti-dumping investigations with the government’s assistance.151
148 See e.g. Mehul Srivastava, ‘India-China Trade Tensions Rise’, Bloomberg Businessweek,
11 February 2009, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/feb2009/
gb20090211_202935.htm (visited 5 June 2010) (‘China threatens to bring its opposition
to India’s toy import ban to the WTO, while India seems poised to restrict other Chinese
products.’)
149 Meiguo Shijie Ribao Shelun – Maoyizhan Kaida [US World Journal Op-Ed: The Start of the
Trade War], 18 October 2009 (on file with the author) (in Chinese); Kelugeman Zhuanwen
Gudong Meiguo Yu Zhongguo Da Maoyizhan (Guan Wen) [Paul Krugman Wrote to Encourage
the US to Start a Trade War with China (full text)], CFI.CN, January 8, 2010, available at
http://cfi.cn/p20100108000535.html (visited 20 June 2010) (in Chinese).
150 Ibid.
151 Article 3 of the Provisions on Responding to Antidumping Cases concerning Export
Products (Order of the Ministry of Commerce, No. 12 [2006]) provides that ‘[t]hose enter-
prises that produce and export the products involved to the investigation country or region
during the investigation period of an anti-dumping case shall actively respond to the action’.
1032 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(4)
 at Singapore M
anagem
ent University on Decem
ber 21, 2010
jiel.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The Provisions not only legally fortify public–private partnerships, but also
attempt to stop the escalation of domestic trade disputes argued at the
WTO. Given the government’s aggressive approach to WTO disputes,
Chinese industries have become increasingly inclined to turn to the govern-
ment. For example, in 2010, Chinese paper manufacturers requested that
the government adopt actions immediately after the USDOC imposed un-
favorable preliminary rulings on their exports.152 This is distinguishable
from previous experiences of anti-dumping or subsidies proceedings, where
Chinese industries considered asking for the government’s assistance only
after the issuance of final rulings by the USDOC.
V. CONCLUSION
China’s entrance into the family of nations occurred after it succumbed to
the demand of Western powers to open its trade regime. This historical
background and its Marxist–Leninist ideology noticeably contributed to
China’s suspicions about the modern legal order and international tribunals.
While this hesitant mentality persisted, private enterprises’ interactions with
foreign trade rules during the economic reform era prompted the govern-
ment and academia’s interest in developing the study of international eco-
nomic law. China’s accession to the WTO provided a new momentum to this
new discipline. The government’s attention swiftly focused on enhancing its
legal capacity building in order to cope with WTO disputes. The evolution
of China’s approach to WTO litigation is best depicted as assertive legalism.
To protect its legitimate interests under WTO rules, China has transformed
its initial passive attitude. As recent disputes demonstrate, China not only
defends its cases vigorously, but also acts preemptively by filing cases against
the US and the European Union. This transformation furthers its integration
into the international legal order.
Although embedded weaknesses in its legal education and government
structures pose institutional obstacles, China has developed its approach to
enhancing its WTO legal capacity. Its experience provides valuable lessons
for other emerging economies. The government’s goal is to strengthen
public–private cooperation in WTO disputes. Notably, local governments
established think tanks, widely known as WTO centers, to bridge the infor-
mation and commutation gap between the industries and government. They
assist China’s Ministry of Commerce in identifying foreign trade barriers,
The text is available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/displayModeTwo.asp?ID=
5435&DB=1&keyword= (visited 20 June 2010).
152 See Ding Qingfen, ‘WTO Ruling on Coasted Paper Row Sought’, China Daily, 11 May
2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-05/11/content_9833150.htm (visited 20
June 2010) (‘On April 29, the US Commerce Department said it was imposing preliminary
anti-dumping duties of up to 136 percent on coasted paper imports from China, . . . and
China will make the appeal to the WTO in June’.)
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providing legal support for enterprises to handle litigation abroad and oper-
ating early warning systems to help companies avoid foreign anti-dumping
investigations. To train its own WTO lawyers, China has consistently parti-
cipated in WTO disputes as a third party, hence providing a low-cost op-
portunity for lawyers in the Department of Treaty and Law and Chinese
firms to cultivate DSU expertise. The bidding requirement that compels
international trade law firms to cooperate with local firms further upgrades
the latter’s litigation experience. China’s WTO bar is therefore emerging.
China’s 10-year experience as a WTO member has shaped the country’s
global vision. This emerging economic power has taken a more assertive role
in shaping WTO rules and defending its political and commercial interests in
WTO disputes. Although the success of China’s WTO strategy remains to be
seen, it can be expected that as the WTO transforms China’s position in the
international arena, China will continue to pose challenges and opportunities
to the multilateral trading system.
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